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Abstract
An important determinant of a pathogen’s success is the rate at which it is transmitted from infected to susceptible hosts.
Although there are anecdotal reports that methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) clones vary in their
transmissibility in hospital settings, attempts to quantify such variation are lacking for common subtypes, as are methods
for addressing this question using routinely-collected MRSA screening data in endemic settings. Here we present a method
to quantify the time-varying transmissibility of different subtypes of common bacterial nosocomial pathogens using routine
surveillance data. The method adapts approaches for estimating reproduction numbers based on the probabilistic
reconstruction of epidemic trees, but uses relative hazards rather than serial intervals to assign probabilities to different
sources for observed transmission events. The method is applied to data collected as part of a retrospective observational
study of a concurrent MRSA outbreak in the United Kingdom with dominant endemic MRSA clones (ST22 and ST36) and an
Asian ST239 MRSA strain (ST239-TW) in two linked adult intensive care units, and compared with an approach based on a
fully parametric transmission model. The results provide support for the hypothesis that the clones responded differently to
an infection control measure based on the use of topical antiseptics, which was more effective at reducing transmission of
endemic clones. They also suggest that in one of the two ICUs patients colonized or infected with the ST239-TW MRSA
clone had consistently higher risks of transmitting MRSA to patients free of MRSA. These findings represent some of the first
quantitative evidence of enhanced transmissibility of a pandemic MRSA lineage, and highlight the potential value of
tailoring hospital infection control measures to specific pathogen subtypes.
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Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is responsible
for a high burden of morbidity and mortality worldwide [1–4].
While community-associated MRSA is becoming increasingly
important globally [5,6], in many countries, including the United
Kingdom, MRSA remains predominantly a nosocomial pathogen
[7,8]. The dominant sequence type (ST) in Asia is ST239, and
recent analysis of whole-genome sequence data has shown that this
ST has distinct lineages in Asia, Europe and South America which
probably share a European ancestor [9–11]. Little is known about
what has enabled this ST to be so successful, or whether its
propensity to transmit between hosts differs from other MRSA
types in certain settings. A recent concurrent outbreak due to an
ST239 MRSA strain (ST239-TW, subsequently referred to as
TW) and the two dominant endemic UK MRSA types (ST22 and
ST36, which we refer to as non-TW) in two linked adult intensive
care units in a London teaching hospital provided a rare
opportunity to compare the transmissibility of different MRSA
types in the same clinical setting [12].
The transmissibility of a potentially emerging pathogen (the rate
at which it spreads from an infected host to exposed susceptible
hosts) is an important factor in determining its success and, in the
case of an established pathogen, for estimating how effective
interventions must be to bring an epidemic under control [13,14].
Quantifying the degree to which strains of a nosocomial pathogen
differ in their transmissibility in a particular setting could lead to
a better understanding of why major clonal replacements occur.
Measuring how such transmissibility changes in response to
interventions would allow us to quantify the value of specific
control measures, which may vary according to the strain [15].
This could lead to better resource use by allowing us to choose
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analysis has greatest relevance for predominantly clonal organ-
isms, such as S. aureus, where distinct lineages cocirculate over
extended periods of time [10].
A fundamental measure of the overall transmission potential of
a pathogen in a given setting is the basic reproduction number, R0.
This is defined as the mean number of secondary cases generated
by a typical case in a fully susceptible population [16,17]. If the
transmissibility of each infected host remains constant throughout
its infectious period, and if each infected host has an equal chance
of infecting each susceptible host, then R0 is simply the product of
the mean rate at which an infected host generates secondary
infections and the mean infectious period (provided the two are
not correlated).
The self-sustaining chain reaction that constitutes a major
epidemic is possible only if R0 is greater than one. If it is less than
one, although there may be some self-limiting chains of secondary
transmission following the introduction of an index case (and quite
large clusters become possible as R0 approaches one), this will not
lead to a sustained increase in cases and, in a large population, only a
small proportion of susceptible hosts will be infected [18]. An
important related number is the net (or effective) reproduction
number, Rt. This is defined as the average number of secondary
cases generated by a case infected at time t,a c c o u n t i n gf o r
incomplete host susceptibility to infection and control measures in
place. If Rt is greater than one at time t, the epidemic will (on
average)begrowing.IfRt islessthanone,itwillbedeclining[16,19].
These reproduction numbers are central to a mechanistic
understanding of infectious disease epidemiology, and a number of
methods for estimating them from different types of surveillance
data have been devised [16,19–23]. However, epidemics that
predominantly affect hospitalized patients require some special
considerations. First, unlike the community setting, the population
of those exposed to infection changes rapidly over time as patients
are admitted and discharged. Second, most common nosocomial
pathogens are bacteria which can be carried asymptomatically
over long periods, during which time colonized hosts may have
several hospital admissions. This can give rise to distinctive dy-
namics: in addition to the usual explosive outbreaks, we also see
epidemic patterns characterized by a sequence of self-limiting
clusters of transmission which, over time, become more frequent
and eventually coalesce into an exponentially growing epidemic
[24,25].
The concept of the single admission reproduction number, Ra,
can help in the understanding of these features of hospital
epidemics [25,26]. Ra is defined as the mean number of secondary
cases caused by a typical infectious patient during a single
admission to a particular hospital or ward otherwise free of the
pathogen. Necessarily, Ra is less than or equal to R0. However, if
Rav1 and R0w1 then every outbreak will be locally controlled in
the short term, but, with repeated challenges to the hospital, long-
term control failure will be inevitable. This results from the
persistence of carriage following discharge which, over time, leads
to a gradual increase in numbers colonized on admission. To
account for changing numbers of susceptibles, we can also define a
net single admission reproduction number, Ra,t. This is analogous to Rt
and represents the average number of secondary cases generated
during a single hospital/ward admission where not everyone is
necessarily susceptible.
Direct ascertainment of Ra and Ra,t would be possible if we
could reliably assess who infected whom during a hospital outbreak.
In practice, even with detailed surveillance and molecular typing
data, there is almost always considerable uncertainty about the true
transmission tree. Instead, computationally-intensive approaches
based on fitting mechanistic mathematical models to data which
account for uncertainty in transmission routes and screening data
represent the state-of-the art for analysing nosocomial transmission
dynamics [27–32]. However, such approaches require detailed data
on both susceptible and colonized or infected patients, and an
assumption that temporal changes in the transmissibility can be
described parametrically by some standard functional form (most
commonly, piecewise constant). As currently implemented they do
not allow direct estimates of the number of transmission events
associated with each patient.
The aims of this paper are twofold: to describe a new approach
(method 1) for estimating Ra,t using hospital surveillance data; and
to use it to analyse MRSA data from concurrent outbreaks with
different MRSA types (TW and non-TW) in two linked adult
intensive care units (ICUs). The method is simple to use
and enables us to track how Ra,t changes over time without
the assumption that changes in transmissibility follow a fixed
functional form, and without requiring data on susceptible
patients. The method extends techniques for the probabilistic
reconstruction of epidemic trees developed for analyzing foot and
mouth disease and SARS data [21,33–35]. We contrast results
using this approach with that from a fully parametric mechanistic
model (method 2), which represents an adaptation of previ-
ously described parametric models for nosocomial infection to a
multistrain system [31,32]. This second approach allows Ra to be
estimated. It requires more detailed data and stronger assump-
tions, but allows us to explicitly test hypotheses about how
transmissibility is affected by interventions, and how it varies
between different wards and subtypes of MRSA. While between-
clone and between-ward differences in single admission effective
reproduction numbers, Ra,t, calculated using method 1 may be
caused by differences in transmissibility, number of susceptibles,
and lengths of stays, with method 2 we assume all MRSA positive
patients have the same length of stay distribution and explic-
itly adjust for different numbers of susceptible patients when
calculating Ra.
Author Summary
Different strains of hospital pathogens may differ in their
ability to spread between patients and respond differently
to control measures. Attempts to quantify such between-
strain variation are lacking in high prevalence settings. We
analysed data from concurrent outbreaks with different
MRSA strains in two adult intensive care units. MRSA is
usually carried by patients asymptomatically, and most of
our data came from routine screening swabs used to
detect such carriage. We divided strains into two groups:
common United Kingdom strains and strains from a type
often found in Southeast Asia. We developed a new
method to estimate how transmission changes over time
and compared results with those from an adaptation of a
previously described approach. An advantage of the new
method is that it makes weaker assumptions about the
process generating the data. The methods gave broadly
similar results: the introduction of daily antiseptic body-
washes for all patients was the only intervention associ-
ated with a substantial fall in transmission, but this
intervention was less effective for the Asian strain. This
work should be useful for assessing the between-strain
variation in the transmission of other hospital pathogens,
and for assessing the impact of interventions on patient-
to-patient transmission.
Reproduction Numbers for Nosocomial Pathogens
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Probabilistic tree reconstruction (method 1)
Under baseline assumptions, on ICU1 there were 282 MRSA
importation events (episodes where patients were assumed to be
MRSA positive when admitted to the ICU) and 132 acquisition
events. These comprised of 12 importations and 23 acquisitions
with TW MRSA and 270 importations and 109 acquisitions with
non-TW MRSA. On ICU2 there were 285 importations (25 with
TW) and 166 acquisitions (43 with TW) (figure 1). Importations
with non-TW to the respective ICUs decreased from 0.20 and
0.19 per day in phase 1 to 0.11 and 0.13 per day in phase 4. In
contrast, importations with TW MRSA peaked in phase 2 in both
ICUs (at 0.03 and 0.12 per day) and were at or below 0.01 per day
in phases 1 and 4. Amongst patients who were MRSA positive on
admission the median length of stay was 12 days (inter quartile
range [IQR]4, 18) for TW-positive patients and 6 days (IQR 3, 13)
for non-TW patients (p~0:01, Wilcoxon rank sum test with
continuity correction). For patients who acquired MRSA the
corresponding numbers were 26.5 (13.25, 42.5) for TW patients
and 19 (12, 29.25) for non-TW patients (p~0:02). There was no
evidence that length of stay differed by ward (p~0:79), or by study
phase (p~0:44, Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test).
Over the study period (January 2002 to April 2006) there were
three interventions (referred to as A, B and C) and these define
four study phases. Estimated net single admission case reproduc-
tion numbers (expected number of secondary cases per case during
a single ward admission) associated with each MRSA-positive
patient episode are shown in figure 2 (bottom panel) together with
histograms of case reproduction numbers for each ward and study
phase (top panel). These highlight wide between-patient variability
which decreases in the second half of phase 4 when transmission is
reduced and the TW clone is eliminated. While most patients have
a very low expected number of secondary cases, 22 out of 103
patients (21%) with TW MRSA are expected to transmit to at least
one other patient. Corresponding numbers for non-TW MRSA
are 40 out of 762 (4%). This proportion was consistently higher for
TW MRSA in all four study phases: 25, 11, 18 and 31% versus 7,
0, 9 and 2% for non-TW MRSA.
Aggregating these reproduction numbers into four-week
intervals highlights the temporal trends, differences between wards
and impact of interventions (figure 3). In ICU1 these suggest
similar patterns of transmission for the different MRSA types for
the period prior to intervention C (a surface antiseptic protocol). In
contrast, there were marked differences between MRSA types in
ICU2 and throughout the study period the four-week averaged
Figure 1. Incidence and prevalence of TW and non-TW MRSA strains on ICU 1 and ICU 2. Red and black filled areas indicate the number of
patients known to be colonized or infected with TW and non-TW MRSA on each ward at each time point (assuming MRSA is not cleared during the
ward stay). Vertical broken lines indicate the timing of interventions A, B and C. Symbols above each graph indicate the number of MRSA acquisitions
and importations each day under baseline assumptions (see protocol S1 and table S1 in supporting information for details of assumptions and
corresponding numbers under alternative assumptions).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.g001
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for non-TW clones when both types were present. These
differences are also seen when reproduction numbers are averaged
over study phases (table 1); the TW clone had a higher repro-
duction number than the non-TW MRSA in each phase in ICU2
but not in ICU1. Reproduction numbers for TW MRSA were also
more volatile than those for non-TW MRSA in ICU2. There was
evidence from both units to suggest differences between the
MRSA types in their response to infection control interventions:
while the net reproduction number of non-TW MRSA fell to a low
level following intervention C in both ICUs, this was not the case
for the TW clone which continued to transmit for several months
at pre-intervention levels. Eventually, the TW outbreak came to
an end after all patients with TW MRSA were treated empirically
with systemic antibiotics (linezolid) from 1st September 2004
[12,15]. After this intervention, although patients with TW MRSA
continued to be imported into the ICUs, only three isolated
apparent transmission events occurred (figure 1). When reproduc-
tion numbers for the two ICUs combined were estimated (allowing
for cross transmission between ICUs) the results suggested the
reproduction number of the TW clone was consistently higher
than that for the non-TW MRSA and varied little throughout the
study period (table 1). Reproduction numbers for the non-TW
clones, in contrast, fell in phase 2 and 4. These results were not
Figure 2. Expected numbers of secondary cases per case. Top panel shows histograms for expected numbers of secondary cases resulting
from each case on the two ICUs (combined) in each of the four study phases (red is TW MRSA, white is non-TW) as calculated using method 1. The
scatterplot (bottom panel) shows the same data, plotted according to the date MRSA was first isolated. Dates of interventions A, B and C are
indicated by broken vertical lines. Smoothed trend lines (lowess smoothing where 10% of the points influence the smoothed value) are also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.g002
Reproduction Numbers for Nosocomial Pathogens
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 4 April 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e1002454highly sensitive to the assumed strength of coupling between the
two ICUs or to the MRSA acquisition assumptions (supplemen-
tary table S2).
Maximum likelihood (method 2)
Results from method 2 showed broad agreement with these
findings, but in contrast to method 1 made a priori assumptions
about the timing of the changes in transmissibility (tables 2–3,
figure S1). On both wards, averaging over all phases, there was
about a 1 in 400 chance of a given susceptible patient acquiring
MRSA from a particular MRSA-positive patient on a particular
day (table 2). When estimates of daily transmission probabilities
from a single MRSA positive patient were constrained to take the
same values for the TW and non-TW clones but were allowed to
vary by ward and study phase, we found clinically significant
variation between the four study phases in both ICUs (table 2). In
particular, while estimates were similar in phases 1 to 3, there was
a marked reduction in phase 4. There was no strong evidence that
these joint estimates (for all MRSA clones) varied by ICU in any of
the study phases (table 2). These findings were robust to the
assumptions made about acquisition events and times (supple-
mentary table S3).
Extending this analysis to allow transmission probabilities to
vary with the MRSA type enabled differences between MRSA
clones and wards to be quantified (table 3) and allowed hypothesis
tests about whether the daily transmission probabilities differed
between strains (thus allowing us to test whether the observed
differences in transmissibility found using method 1 could be
entirely explained by the longer length of stay of the TW patients).
In ICU1 no consistent differences were seen. In ICU2 the TW
Figure 3. Rat estimates for MRSA types TW and non-TW obtained using method 1. Estimates of net single admission reproduction numbers
(Rat) for TW clones (red) and non-TW clones (black) are shown in terms of the point estimate (central white line), 80% CIs (dark shaded region) and
95% CI (light shaded region) for each four-week averaged reproduction number obtained by averaging individual patient reproduction numbers
according to the ICU admission date. Interventions A, B and C are indicated by vertical arrows.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.g003
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patients in each of the four study phases under the baseline
assumption of complete bacterial interference, though confidence
intervals were wide and showed considerable overlap. Differences
between TW and non-TW MRSA transmission probabilities
reached statistical significance at the 5% level for both wards
combined and for ICU1, but not for ICU2 alone, and in only one
of the four phases (phase 4) using combined data from both ICUs.
This phase corresponded to the introduction of the surface
antiseptic bodywash protocol, which was associated with a more
than halving of the transmission probability from a patient with
non-TW MRSA compared to earlier phases. The fall in the
transmission probability for TW MRSA in phase 4 was smaller,
and likely to be confounded by the use of linezolid for TW carriers
in this phase. Large differences in transmission probabilities for the
two MRSA types were also seen in phase 2 (corresponding to
the introduction of hand hygiene promotion), but in this case
confidence intervals were wider reflecting the short duration of this
phase. In other phases differences between TW and non-TW
estimates were much smaller. The magnitude of the differences
depended on which patients were assumed to be susceptible.
Under the baseline assumption that patients colonized with
one strain were not susceptible to acquiring another (complete
bacterial interference) the differences were larger than in the
sensitivity analysis where no bacterial interference was assumed
(table3).Thiscanbeexplainedbythe higherprevalenceofnon-TW
MRSA clones; under the assumption of no bacterial interference
all non-TW MRSA positive patients would be considered
susceptible to infection or colonisation with TW MRSA and vice
versa. Changing from complete interference to no interference
therefore results in a greater increase in the number of susceptibles
available for the TW clones to infect than it does for the non-TW
clones. To accommodate these changes, a larger reduction in the
daily transmission probability for TW clones is required. Overall,
combining data from both wards, the TW clone was estimated to
have a daily transmission probability that was between 63 and
100% higher than the non-TW clones in phase 4, and between 53
and 94%higher inphase 2 (the lower numbers corresponding to the
no bacterial interference assumption) though the differences only
reached significance at the 5% level in phase 4 and only under
baseline interference assumptions. Transmission probabilities were
broadly similar in the two other study phases. Estimates of the
single-admission reproduction number (Ra) from the model without
background transmission (and assuming TW and non-TW patients
have the same length of stay distribution) are reported in the sup-
plementary material (figure S1). Results were robust to the assump-
tions made about the number and timing of MRSA acquisition
events (supplementary table S4), but fitting a more complex model
allowing patient-to-patient transmission and transmission from
background sources suggested that the relative importance of
patient-to-patient and background transmission could not be
reliably identified in such hyperendemic settings without additional
data (supplementary table S5).
Discussion
Common bacterial nosocomial pathogens have distinct dynam-
ics from typical community pathogens and call for different
analytical approaches. Important features of hospital epidemics
with such organisms include: i) a host population that changes
rapidly over time in comparison with the timescale of epidemic
dynamics; ii) a high proportion of infected (or colonized) hosts who
are already infected when they enter the population (the hospital
or ward); iii) a dominant role for asymptomatic infection so
infected hosts can usually only be identified using screening swabs,
leading to large uncertainty in the timing of transmission events;
iv) a lack of a well-defined serial interval or generation time (since
asymptomatic carriage can persist for months or years, but
transmission is only intermittently observed during hospital
admissions). The probabilistic tree reconstruction approach
described above (method 1) overcame these limitations by using
a hazards-based approach applied to patient screening data to
assign probabilities to potential source patients for observed
Table 1. Estimated ward-level reproduction numbers (s.e.) for
TW and non-TW MRSA clones using method 1.
Phases
1234
ICU1 TW MRSA 0.14 (0.10) 0.65 (0.17) 0.14 (0.08) 0.54 (0.22)
ICU1 Non-TW MRSA 0.36 (0.03) 0.31 (0.08) 0.41 (0.07) 0.14 (0.03)
ICU2 TW MRSA 0.73 (0.19) 0.41 (0.11) 0.58 (0.22) 0.58 (0.17)
ICU2 Non-TW MRSA 0.40 (0.04) 0.21 (0.06) 0.52 (0.15) 0.17 (0.03)
Combined
ICUs
TW MRSA 0.71 (0.17) 0.50 (0.09) 0.56 (0.17) 0.64 (0.15)
Combined
ICUs
Non-TW MRSA 0.38 (0.02) 0.20 (0.03) 0.47 (0.08) 0.15 (0.02)
Phase-specific estimates of ward-level reproduction numbers for TW MRSA and
Non-TW MRSA derived using Method 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.t001
Table 2. q estimates for TW and non-TW combined.
Phases P-value
1
1 2 3 4 All phases
ICU1 0.0032 (0.0025, 0.0040) 0.0030 (0.0017, 0.0054) 0.0032 (0.0022, 0.0046) 0.0012 (0.0008, 0.0017) 0.0024 (0.0020, 0.0028) v0:0001
ICU2 0.0036 (0.0029, 0.0040) 0.0033 (0.0020, 0.0056) 0.0037 (0.0025, 0.0054) 0.0016 (0.0012, 0.0022) 0.0028 (0.0024, 0.0032) v0:0001
Combined 0.0034 (0.0029, 0.0040) 0.0032 (0.0022, 0.0047) 0.0034 (0.0026, 0.0044) 0.0014 (0.0011, 0.0018) 0.0026 (0.0023, 0.0029) v0:0001
P-value
2 0.17 0.43 0.82 0.54 0.23
Phase-specific estimates for the daily probability of a susceptible patient acquiring MRSA from an MRSA positive patient in the same ward, for ICU 1 and ICU 2 (without
distinguishing between TW and non-TW strains). In the Combined row, the estimates are constrained to be the same in both wards, and the All phases column constrains
the estimates to be the same in the four phases.
1P-values test the null hypothesis that transmission does not vary between study phase (likelihood ratio test, df=3).
2P-values test the null hypothesis that transmission in the current phase does not differ between wards (likelihood ratio test, df=1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.t002
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epidemic trees and estimate reproduction numbers appears to
have first been suggested by Kenah et al [36]. Results using this
method were supplemented with a maximum likelihood approach
(method 2) where the timing of cross-infection events was assumed
to be known but which allowed estimation of the daily trans-
mission probability, enabling us to study effects related to study
phase and MRSA type while controlling for differences in length
of stay.
These methods were applied to data from two adjacent general
ICUs in which admission and weekly MRSA screens and culture
results from clinical samples identified patients admitted with and
acquiring MRSA over a four year period. During that time there
was sustained transmission with endemic MRSA and a newly
introduced TW variant.
Both analytical methods supported the hypothesis that inter-
vention C (the surface antiseptic protocol) was associated with a
sustained reduction in MRSA transmission, and both indicated
a reduced effect for the TW clone. Both methods gave point
estimates that indicated elevated transmission of TW MRSA
compared with endemic strains in all four study phases in ICU2
but not ICU1. There were, however, some differences: the ward-
level reproduction numbers (method 1) tended to indicate greater
increased transmission for the TW compared to non-TW MRSA
than was seen using method 2. This reflects the fact that the
two methods are quantifying different things: method 1 estimates
secondary cases per case, which depends both on transmissibility
and the length of ICU stay while carrying MRSA; method 2,
in contrast, estimates only the daily transmission probability from
one MRSA carrier to one susceptible patient. This will not be
affected by length of stay. Indeed, there was some evidence that
patients colonised with TW MRSA (particularly those colonised
on ICU admission), had a longer length of stay than those
colonised with non-TW MRSA. This may reflect the link between
MRSA infection and excess length of stay in this cohort [37], and
the increased virulence of the TW strain which was over four times
more likely to cause blood stream infection in colonised patients
compared to non-TW MRSA strains in the same ICUs [12]. Even
in the absence of an increased rate of transmission to other
patients, increased length of stay would lead to a higher single-
admission reproduction number. It is possible that such differences
in length of stay reflect underlying differences in the characteristics
of patients most vulnerable to acquiring the different MRSA types.
For example, because the TW outbreak was centred on the two
ICUs, patients carrying TW on ICU admission might be more
likely than patients carrying non-TW MRSA to have had recent
ICU admissions. The TW clones showed a far broader range
of antibiotic-resistance than endemic MRSA clones and have
previously been shown to preferentially colonise vascular catheters
but not carriage sites compared with endemic strains [12]. Taken
together, these observations suggest that the TW MRSA could
represent a phenotype particularly adapted to transmission in
Table 3. Estimates of the daily transmission probability (q) from one exposed to one susceptible patient.
Complete
Bacterial
Interference
Phases P-value
1
1 2 3 4 All phases
ICU1 TW MRSA 0.0010 (0.0002,0.0069) 0.0030(0.0011,0.0084) 0.0001(0.0000,0.0398) 0.0027(0.0011,0.0064) 0.0020(0.0011,0.0037) 0:02
Non-TW MRSA 0.0031(0.0025,0.0040) 0.0011(0.0003,0.0036) 0.0030(0.0020,0.0045) 0.0009(0.0006,0.0014) 0.0021(0.0017,0.0025)
ICU2 TW MRSA 0.0040(0.0022,0.0074) 0.0037 (0.0019,0.0071) 0.0041(0.0019,0.0091) 0.0021 (0.0011,0.0037) 0.0031(0.0022,0.0042) 0:69
Non-TW MRSA 0.0033(0.0027,0.0042) 0.0026(0.0011,0.0063) 0.0030(0.0019,0.0048) 0.0014 (0.0009,0.0020) 0.0025(0.0021,0.0030)
Both TW MRSA 0.0031(0.0017,0.0056) 0.0035(0.0021,0.0061) 0.0025(0.0011,0.0056) 0.0022 (0.0014,0.0036) 0.0027(0.0021,0.0037) v0:0001
Non-TW MRSA 0.0032(0.0027,0.0038) 0.0018(0.0009,0.0037) 0.0030(0.0022,0.0041) 0.0011 (0.0008,0.0015) 0.0023(0.0020,0.0026)
P-value
2 0.94 0.14 0.69 0.03 0.28
No Bacterial
Interference
Phases P-value
1
1 2 3 4 All phases
ICU1 TW MRSA 0.0009(0.0001,0.0059) 0.0027(0.0010,0.0073) 0.0000(0.0000,1.0000) 0.0023(0.0010,0.0056) 0.0017(0.0009,0.0032) 0:01
Non-TW MRSA 0.0030(0.0023,0.0039) 0.0012(0.0003,0.0033) 0.0027(0.0018,0.0042) 0.0009(0.0005,0.0014) 0.0020(0.0017,0.0025)
ICU2 TW MRSA 0.0030(0.0016,0.0056) 0.0022(0.0011,0.0042) 0.0034(0.0015,0.076) 0.0016(0.0009,0.0028) 0.0022(0.0016,0.0031) 0:961
Non-TW MRSA 0.0031(0.0025,0.0039) 0.0018(0.0008,0.0044) 0.0028(0.0018,0.0045) 0.0013(0.0009,0.0019) 0.0023(0.0019,0.0027)
Both TW MRSA 0.0025(0.0014,0.0044) 0.0023(0.0014,0.0040) 0.0021(0.0010,0.0047) 0.0018(0.0011,0.0029) 0.0021(0.0016,0.0028) 0:001
Non-TW MRSA 0.0030(0.0026,0.0036) 0.0015(0.0007,0.0029) 0.0028(0.0021,0.0038) 0.0011(0.0008,0.0015) 0.0022(0.0019,0.0024)
P-value
2 0.47 0.29 0.48 0.11 0.85
Estimates of the daily transmission probability (q) from one exposed to one susceptible patient.
1P-values test the null hypothesis that transmission varies between study phases but not MRSA types against the alternative that it varies between study phases and
MRSA types (likelihood ratio test, df=4).
2P-values test the null hypothesis that transmission in the study phase does not differ between TW and Non-TW MRSA using combined data from both wards (likelihood
ratio test, df=1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002454.t003
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patient catheterisation, perhaps at the expense of persistence
outside these areas. There is some evidence that such adaptation
results from both increased persistence in the ICU (perhaps by
targeting long-stay patients, and causing infections that increase
length of stay) and from an increased daily transmission
probability (particularly in the presence of widespread antiseptic
use). Caveats, of course, apply: differences in lengths of stays
between TW and non-TW colonized/infected patients could be
confounded by exposure history (the recent arrival of the TW
clone rather than its biological properties may account for the
different patient characteristics). Differences in daily transmission
probabilities could also be subject to such confounding and could
also have arisen by chance (in all phases – even phase 4, where the
effect size was largest – confidence intervals were wide).
The mechanisms underlying variations in transmissibility of
different MRSA (and S. aureus) strains are poorly understood.
Reasons for the differences in the two ICUs are also unclear.
Chance variation cannot be ruled out, as the formal investigation
of transmission potential of different MRSA types was, in part,
motivated by perceived differences in transmissibility (using the
same data), and the usual limitations of post hoc analyses therefore
apply. Also, although the analyses accounts for demographic
stochasticity, there may also be important sources of environmen-
tal stochasticity which are not accounted for. It seems unlikely
that the difference in TW transmission in the two ICUs can be
explained by colonized staff: a universal staff screening programme
failed to detect the TW clone during the outbreak [12]. Dif-
ferences in infection control practice also seem unlikely but cannot
be ruled out: the two wards share the same infection control
policies and staff pool, with medical and nursing staff rotating
between units at 3–6 monthly intervals, though only physiother-
apy, radiology and pharmacy staff worked across both units at the
same time. It is possible that the built environment influences
MRSA transmission. ICU2 was last refurbished in 1969, retaining
a mixture of original materials including wood, and has much less
open space, only eight sinks, and one side room, whereas ICU1
was refurbished in 1999 to an open plan configuration with better
space utilization, 19 sinks and three side rooms. The reduced
availability of sinks, side rooms and space to circulate may have
adversely affected the ability to carry out infection control practice
or cleaning, although it is unclear why this should only affect TW
MRSA, which was not detected on environmental screening
during the outbreak [12].
Despite anecdotal reports that some lineages of S. aureus strains
have an enhanced epidemic potential in hospital settings [38],
objective assessments of between-strain variation in transmissibility
are largely lacking. Such variation is nonetheless to be expected
given the large degree of phenotypic variation in different S. aureus
and MRSA clones, and the dominance of a small number of
MRSA lineages [39]. One of the few instances where the
nosocomial transmission potential of different subtypes of the
same nosocomial pathogen have been quantified comes from a
comparison of the onward transmission from patients admitted to
hospitals in the Netherlands carrying MRSA [40]. In this case,
because MRSA introductions were infrequent (as MRSA preva-
lence in hospitals in the Netherlands is below 1%) and contact
tracing extensive, the secondary cases could be assigned to distinct
clusters of transmission following identified introductions. This
allowed the authors to use methods based on a branching process
model to estimate the single admission reproduction number, RA
[41]. It was found that newly admitted ST398 MRSA strains
(which are commonly associated with livestock production) had a
greatly reduced propensity to spread compared with other MRSA
sequence types, with an RA value (95% CI) of only 0.16 (0.04–
0.40), about one sixth of the corresponding value for non-ST398
MRSA. The authors concluded that less stringent control
measures were likely to be sufficient to control ST398 MRSA
clones than those needed for non-ST398 MRSA types.
Such methods would not have been applicable for our data, and
the first method used here to quantify the transmissibility of
different strains (method 1) instead built on recent approaches to
estimate reproduction numbers by probabilistically reconstructing
epidemic trees. Such tree-reconstructions have used simple rule-
based methods, for example assigning sources from a candidate list
based on proximity data [33], more formal semi-parametric
methods using partial likelihoods and assuming a known serial
interval distribution [21,34], and, most recently, semi-parametric
hazard-based approaches [36]. Hazard-based approaches have
some advantages over the first two methods: they avoid some of
the arbitrary assumptions of the rule-based approaches, do not
require knowledge of the serial interval distribution, and can avoid
biases that arise from the fact that the serial interval distribution
changes over the course of an epidemic. Advantages over ap-
proaches based on fitting a full transmission model include fewer
assumptions, in particular with regard to the functional form of
changes in the transmission potential over time. In this respect,
tree reconstruction approaches have some similarities with other
semi-parametric approaches that make use of survival analytical
methods, such as the approach adopted by Wolkewitz et al., who
derived non-parametric estimates of a time-varying transmission
rate changed over time using a Martingale-based method [42].
An important difference in the current approach is that we are
specifically interested in estimating how the distribution of the
number of secondary cases resulting from each case changes over
time. The method 1 approach described here also makes relatively
low demands for data (with no information required for patients
who do not become colonized or infected), has a low computa-
tional burden, and can be easily adapted to cope with co-
circulating subtypes as in the application here. This approach is
appropriate when the daily probability of a patient acquiring
MRSA is small, as in this case reconstructed epidemic trees will be
approximately independent of this probability. This approxima-
tion is likely to be reasonable for all but the most explosive
outbreaks. For example, using the exact formula we found that
changing this probability from a baseline of 0.005 to 0.001 and
0.025 changed the estimated mean reproduction numbers for each
phase and MRSA type by less than 3%.
Two assumptions underlying the analytical approaches used
here are i) that new MRSA acquisitions can be explained by
patient-to-patient spread within the units (which is likely to
be mediated by contacts with transiently colonized healthcare
workers) and ii) that risk of transmission increases in line with
colonization pressure (the number of patients with MRSA on the
ward). While these assumptions are supported by observational
and quasi experimental studies [43,44], it would be desirable
to more rigorously challenge them. Unfortunately, unpublished
simulation studies and analysis here with a more complex model
allowing different transmission routes (table S5) both suggest that
the ability to identify the relative importance of background and
patient-to-patient transmission may be limited in hyper-endemic
settings in the absence of more discriminatory typing data. The
inability of our typing methods to reliably distinguish between
non-TW MRSA types, or to identify genetic variants of the TW
clone therefore represent important limitations of this work. High
resolution genotyping data would enable more definitive assess-
ments of who infects whom, and therefore allow us to quantify the
Reproduction Numbers for Nosocomial Pathogens
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at different times with greater certainty.
Figure 1 confirms that not all acquisition events can be
explained by transmission from a known MRSA positive patient
from the same ward. The combined-ICU analysis, allowing for
between-ward transmission, is able to account for some MRSA
acquisitions where no known source was present on the same
ward, and this explains why combined ICU estimates of the
reproduction number are sometimes outside the range of
individual ICU estimates (table 1), but unknown MRSA sources
are also likely to be present in the patient population [32]. A full
model-based analysis using data augmentation (which estimates
model parameters and latent parameters that represent ‘‘unob-
served’’ - or augmented - data, typically using Markov chain
Monte Carlo methods for fitting) could account for such unknown
sources. Such an approach retains some important advantages for
analysing typical surveillance data. These include the ability to
account for imperfect swab sensitivity and for uncertainty in
the number and timing of acquisition events, circumventing the
need to make arbitrary assumptions about which patients were
colonized on admission to a ward. In the present context such an
analysis would allow us to explicitly account for the change in
the screening protocol in November 2004. Since this involved
screening more body sites, it is likely to have increased screening
sensitivity and led to increased detection of MRSA, potentially
biasing the estimated effect of intervention C. To date, however,
no published work has adapted such approaches to cope with
multiple co-circulating subtypes. The method 2 used here can be
thought of as a simplified version of such an approach (in that it is
based on a fully-specified mechanistic transmission model) but it
avoids the complexities of data augmentation by assuming the
epidemic process is perfectly observed. An important area for
future work will be to extend data augmentation methods to cope
with carriage of multiple types. Such approaches have been
developed for the sequential carriage of community pathogen
subtypes [45]. Addressing issues of co-colonisation with different
subtypes may be particularly important for some nosocomial
pathogens, and neglecting such effects is a potential source of bias.
In our analysis here we considered two possibilities – complete
bacterial interference (where one strain completely inhibits the
acquisition of another), and no bacterial interference. The reality
may lie somewhere between these two extremes. Such an analysis
will be complicated by the fact that routinely-used laboratory
methods are not well-suited to detecting the simultaneous carriage
of multiple types [46], and sensitivity for detecting a second type
will not, in general, be the same as sensitivity for detecting a single
type.
Methods
Ethics statement
Ethical approval for this research was granted by the NHS
National Research Ethics Service, South East Research Ethics
Committee. All data were analyzed anonymously.
Clinical data and infection control practice
Anonymised data from two 15-bed adult general intensive care
units (ICU) within a 1050-bed teaching hospital in London,
United Kingdom, were collected between 1st January 2002
and 30th April 2006 as described elsewhere [12,15]. Dates of
admission and discharge and MRSA culture results from screen
and clinical samples were analysed for all 4,570 consecutive
patient admissions to both ICUs. Infection control policies were in
place including specifying hand hygiene between patient contacts
and use of contact precautions for known MRSA colonized
patients throughout. On this background three main new MRSA
control interventions were introduced: intervention A (introduced
on 15th July 2003) was an education campaign to promote hand
hygiene and barrier nursing; intervention B (introduced on 15th
October 2003) was isolation of known MRSA colonized patients in
side rooms or in patient and nursing cohort pairs; intervention C
(introduced on 26th April 2004) was a surface antiseptic protocol
which included daily chlorhexidine bodywashes for known MRSA
positive patients, and daily triclosan bodywashes for other patients.
The three interventions defined four study phases for analysis:
phase 1 from 1st January 2002 to 14th July 2003; phase 2 from
15th July to 14th October 2003; phase 3 from 15th October 2003
to 25th April 2004; and phase 4 from 26th April 2004 to 30th
April2006.Patients wereswabbedforMRSA carriageonadmission
and every Monday morning. Swabs were taken from nose, axillae
and perineum until 1st November 2004, when additional rectal
and throat samples were included (a change associated with an
approximate 30% increase in the proportion of patients identified as
carriers on admission to ICU) [47]. Clinical samples were collected
when infectionwas suspected.S. aureus colonies were identified using
a combination of catalase positivity, Staphaurex (Remel Europe
Ltd., Dartford, England) and/or salt mannite positivity with
confirmation by a tube coagulase test. Methicillin resistance was
determined by disc testing. Screen samples were identified using a
selective mannitol broth technique [47].
TW MRSA was defined initially by its distinctive and extensive
antimicrobial resistance pattern, sequence typing and microarray
analysis [12]. More extensive typing of available admission and
acquisition isolates has shown all antimicrobial resistance patterns
defined TW isolates to belong to CC8/239 and non-TW isolates
to be w90% ST22 and ST36 [15]. When TW and non-TW
MRSA isolates were recovered from the same patient, only the
first type recovered was considered. This was, however, rare: two
patients had both types recovered from pooled screening sites; nine
had both types from sputum; and seven had both types from
wounds. Thirteen patients had both types recovered from different
sites. Further details of patient characteristics, interventions,
swabbing sites and microbiological procedures have been
described elsewhere [12,15].
Analysis
We analyse the data using two separate approaches which we
refer to as method 1 and method 2. In both analyses we define a
new MRSA acquisition to have occurred if a patient has a negative
admission screening swab, a subsequent MRSA positive screen or
clinical sample while in the ICU and more than 48 hours after
being admitted to the ward, and no prior MRSA positive isolate in
the 90 days preceding ICU admission. Patients with any MRSA
positive samples taken within 48 hours of admission are assumed
to be positive on admission (MRSA importations). A patient who is
believed to be neither colonized nor infected on a given day is
assumed to be susceptible to becoming colonized or infected by
either MRSA type (see supplementary material for further details).
In the first approach (method 1), which probabilistically recon-
structs the epidemic tree, we assume that the acquisition occurred
one or more days before the first positive screening swab. In the
second approach (method 2) we assume a new acquisition to have
occurred on day t{1 if a patient has his or her first MRSA
positive swab on day t, following a negative MRSA admission
screening swab during the same ward admission.
We also assume i) that once MRSA positive, a patient remains
so until ward discharge (hence no information from swab results
after the first positive is used), and ii) MRSA-positive patients only
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their first positive swab, unless they are assumed to be positive on
admission, in which case they are potential sources from their date
of admission. For patients readmitted to one of the wards following
ward discharge, we apply the same criteria that we use for first
time admission to determine admission colonisation status. We use
a time unit of one day, and take dates of admission and discharge
to represent the first and last whole days of a patient admission.
Notation. We introduce the following notation: let qijt rep-
resent the daily probability of a single susceptible patient in ward i
acquiring MRSA of type j from a single patient on the same ward
at day t who is colonized or infected with MRSA type j. We also
define the daily avoidance probability of acquiring MRSA,
q’ijt~1{qijt.
Denote by Swjt, Cwjt, and Awjt the number of patients on ward
w on day t who are, respectively, susceptible to MRSA type j,
known to be colonized or infected with type j, and found to be
colonized or infected with type j for the first time on day t (having
had a prior negative admission screening swab). Here we take Cwjt
to be the number of patients on ward w on day t who have had at
least one previous positive swab with MRSA type j on or before
day t. We take Awjt to be the number of patients on ward w who
have their first positive swab with MRSA of type j on day t. In our
default method 2 analysis we take Swjt as the number of remaining
patients (i.e. those with no prior MRSA positive swabs during the
current episode) excluding those patients who are discharged on
day t since we assume that acquisitions on the day of discharge
would be not be detected. The tree reconstruction approach
(method 1), in contrast, does not require knowledge of Swjt to
estimate reproduction numbers.
In the application we consider here there are two wards and we
define two subtypes (TW and non-TW), so both w and j can take
values 1 or 2. We also define Nw to be the total number of patient
episodes on ward w over the study period for which there was at
least one MRSA positive swab and Mw to be the total number of
new MRSA acquisitions on ward w over the study period, i.e.
Mw~
P
t
P
j Awjt.
Method 1: Reconstruction of the epidemic tree. The tree-
reconstruction approach calculates the probability that each
observed new MRSA acquisition was acquired from each of the
other MRSA positive patients in one of the two ICUs. In this
approach we condition on the probabilities qijt and assume that all
new acquisitions were acquired from a known patient source. A
scaling factor, s, specifies the reduction in the daily risk of
transmission from an MRSA positive patient in one ward to an
MRSA negative patient in a different ward. We explore the
sensitivity of the results to both the qijt and the s values.
Let pkl represent the conditional probability that patient k
acquired MRSA from patient l given that patient k acquired
MRSA from one of the other
P
w Nw{1 MRSA positive patients.
We calculate the elements pkl of the
P
w Mw|
P
w Nw matrix Pkl
as follows. Define uijt to be the probability that a susceptible
patient on ward i at time t escapes cross-infection from one of the P
w Cwjt MRSA type j positive patients in the ICUs on that day.
Therefore uijt~Pw 1{s(1{ fwg(i))qijt
   Cwjt where fwg(i) is an
indicator function that equals one when w~i and zero otherwise.
Now consider a single patient k on ward i who is free of MRSA on
admission and whose first and last days on the ward are tkf and tkl.
The probability that this patient is free of MRSA type j at the end
of day s (sƒtkl)i s
rkjs~ P
s
t~tkf
uijt
and the probability that this patient acquires MRSA of type j from
patient l on day s is given by
vkljs~(Probability of avoiding infection by the end of day s{1)
|(Probability of acquiring MRSA on day s)
|(Probability of acquiring MRSA from patient l on day s
given that there is an acquisition on day s)
~rkjs{1(1{uijs)
X
w
hwijs lwjs
Cwjs
 !
1
P
w
hwijs
where the hwijt terms represent the hazards of transmission of
MRSA type j from patients in ward w at time t to a patient in
ward i and lijs is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if
patient l is present on ward i and MRSA type j positive on day s
and 0 otherwise. These hazards can be expressed in terms of the
probabilities qijt as hwijt~{Cwjtln(1{qijts
(1{ fwg(i))), which is
approximated by Cwjtqijts
(1{ fwg(i)) when qijt is small, as will
usually be the case.
The conditional probabilities, pkl, which represent the proba-
bility that patient k was infected by patient l given that patient k
was infected by one other patient, are then given by the following
expression, which is approximately independent of qijt when qijt is
small:
pkl~
Ptkl
s~tkf
vkljs
P
m=k
Ptkl
s~tkf
vkmjs
Here m indexes all the patients who could potentially have
infected patient l. The net single admission reproduction number
for patient episode l (i.e. the expected number of secondary cases
resulting from this episode) is then given by
Rl~
X
m
pml
and corresponding reproduction numbers for a given time period
are obtained by averaging over these patient reproduction
numbers for all patient episodes starting in the given period.
Associated confidence intervals are derived by simulation, by
repeatedly drawing the source of infection for each of the
P
w Mw
new infections from a multinomial distribution with probability
vectors given by the rows of Pkl. All confidence intervals reported
for reproduction numbers are based on the quantiles of 1000 such
simulations.
By default, when analysing both wards together, we assume
minimal cross-infection between the wards (s~0:0001), though
we also consider the opposite extreme (s~1), representing
complete ward mixing. We report results here where qijt is fixed
at 0.005, though also describe results of sensitivity analyses with
values of 0.001 and 0.025.
Method 2: A likelihood-based approach. The second
approach estimates the probabilities qijt using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). With two MRSA types, we assume
that patients susceptible to type 1 are also susceptible to type 2,
so Si1t~Si2t~Sit. This implicitly assumes complete bacterial
interference (i.e. that colonisation with one type of MRSA prevents
acquisition of another type one or more days after the first
acquisition [48]). As a sensitivity analysis we also considered the
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patient colonized with one MRSA type had the same daily risk of
acquiring a different subtype as an uncolonized patient. With the
additional assumption that new MRSA acquisitions occur the day
before they are detected, the log likelihood of the new MRSA
acquisition data in ward i on day t is given by:
LLit~czAi1tlogPi1tzAi2tlogPi2tzSitlogP
0
it
where c is a constant and
N Pi1t~(1{qi2t)
Ci2(t{1) 1{(1{qi1t)
Ci1(t{1)   
N Pi2t~(1{qi1t)
Ci1(t{1) 1{(1{qi2t)
Ci2(t{1)   
N P
0
it~(1{qi1t)
Ci1(t{1)(1{qi2t)
Ci2(t{1)
Here Pi1t(Pi2t) is given by the product of the probability of not
acquiring MRSA type 2(1) on day t{1 and the probability of
acquiring type 1(2). P
0
it is the product of the probabilities of not
acquiring either MRSA type. For completeness we could add a
term to represent acquisition of both types on the same day. In
practice we had no such observations.
The overall log-likelihood is then given by the sum of LLit terms
over i (the two wards) and is maximized using unconstrained
optimization with the Nelder-Mead algorithm [49] as implement-
ed in the function optim in R version 2.11.1 (www.project-r.org).
Approximate 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were derived by
inverting the square matrix of second-order partial derivatives of
the loglikelihood function, i.e. the Hessian.
In practice, with method 2 rather than estimating separate qijt
terms for every day t (which would over-parameterize the model),
we apply constraints. We consider constraints where i) qijt terms
from the same ward and same study phase are required to take the
same value; ii) qijt are the same across all time periods within each
ward; iii) qijt terms from the same study phase are constrained to
take the same value and do not vary across study wards; and iv) qijt
terms are the same for different MRSA types, qi1t~qi2t. These
constraints imply a series of nested models, and we apply likeli-
hood ratio tests to determine whether there is evidence to reject
the hypotheses that these equality constraints represent.
To obtain estimates of Ra requires consideration of the length of
stay distribution. To simplify matters we ignore any potential
additional length of ICU stay caused by infection, but account for
the facts that the longer a susceptible patient stays the greater the
risk of acquiring MRSA, and the longer an MRSA-positive patient
stays the greater the expected number of secondary transmission
events they will cause. In simple models it is often assumed that
there is constant hazard of hospital discharge and the length of
stay distribution is exponential. In such cases the risk of a patient
acquiring MRSA is unrelated to the subsequent length of stay and
Ra is trivially calculated as the product of mean length of stay, the
mean number of exposed patients on the ward, and the daily
probability of transmission from a single source to a single exposed
patient. In practice, the hazard of ICU discharge is likely to
be dependent on the day of stay, and typically decreases with
increasing day of stay. In this case, the patients at greatest risk of
acquiring MRSA (i.e. those who have stayed longest on the ward)
will also have longer expected future stays and will therefore tend
to cause more secondary infections. To account for this we
partition patients into groups defined by the number of ICU days
a randomly-selected patient on the ward would stay after
becoming MRSA positive (assuming no additional stay due to
MRSA). To do this we use the empirical length of stay distribution
and calculate the probability, pi, that a randomly selected patient
on the ICU is a member of group i. This is given by
pi~
P?
k~1 lkzi{1=
P?
k~1 klk, where lk is the probability that a
newly admitted patient stays for k days. Assuming an average of n
exposed patients per day on the ward, and that each patient has a
daily probability, q, of acquiring MRSA from a single MRSA
positive patient on the ward, an MRSA patient in group j will, on
average, transmit MRSA to kij~pi|q|j|n patients in group i
(ignoring saturation effects, which will be negligible for sufficiently
small q). These kij values are the elements of the next generation
matrix. The dominant eigenvalue of this matrix gives the
reproduction number, Ra [20].
In contrast to method 1, which excludes susceptible patients
from the analysis and enables estimates only of the net (or effective)
reproduction number, this method accounts for susceptibles in the
model and therefore allows us to estimate the single-admission
reproduction number (the transmission potential of an MRSA
positive patient in an otherwise fully susceptibility ward). This will
be greater than or equal to the net single-admission reproduction
number, and determines the threshold epidemic behaviour [25]. A
further difference is that this method allows the transmission
potential of an MRSA positive patient to change over time,
according to the current study phase. In contrast, method 1 makes
no explicit assumptions about the timing of changes in the
transmission potential, and net reproduction numbers for a par-
ticular time period relate to the transmission potential of patients
admitted to the ward during that time period even though the
actual transmission events may occur at a later time.
Both methods 1 and 2 assume that MRSA acquisition events
occur as a result of patient-to-patient transmission from known
carriers and exclude observations where there are no potential
source patients. An additional sensitivity analysis therefore extended
method 2 by allowing for both patient-to-patient transmission and
background transmission (for example, from colonized staff or
persistent environmental contamination). If the daily probability of
a susceptible patient on ward i at time t acquiring strain j from such
background sources is q’ijt, then the Pi1t term above is replaced by
(1{q’i2t)(1{qi2t)
Ci2(t{1) 1{(1{q’i1t)(1{qi1t)
Ci1(t{1)   
in the new
model, with similar changes for other terms. When applying this
model, q’i1t was assumed to vary by ward, MRSA type and study
phase, but to remain constant within in a phase.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Single admission reproduction numbers (Ra)
estimated using method 2. Estimates (95% CIs) of the ward-
level reproduction number, Ra, according to study phase, MRSA
type and ward obtained using method 2 and assuming complete
bacterialinterference and nointeractionbetweenICU1andICU2.
(PDF)
Protocol S1 Protocol for defining MRSA importation
and acquisition events.
(PDF)
Table S1 TW and non-TW MRSA importation and
acquisition events under different assumptions. The
baseline assumption classifies all episodes where MRSA was
recovered from an isolate taken within 48 hours of admission as
importations. The SA1 assumption uses a 24 hour cutoff instead.
See protocol S1 in supporting material for full details of baseline
and SA1 assumptions.
(PDF)
Table S2 Estimated ward-level reproduction numbers
(s.e.) for TW and non-TW MRSA clones under alterna-
tive assumptions. Phase-specific estimates of ward-level
reproduction numbers for TW MRSA and Non-TW MRSA
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ward coupling (applies to combined ICU estimates only) and
under SA1 assumptions (see protocol S1 in supporting material for
details of baseline and SA1 assumptions).
(PDF)
Table S3 q estimates for TW and non-TW combined
under SA1 and SA2 assumptions. Sensitivity analysis for
phase-specific estimates for q, the daily probability of a susceptible
patient acquiring MRSA from an MRSA positive patient in the
same ward, for ICU 1 and ICU 2 (without distinguishing between
TW and non-TW strains). In the Combined row, the estimates are
constrained to be the same in both wards, and the All phases
column constrains the estimates to be the same in the four phases.
See protocol S1 in supporting material for details of the SA1 and
SA2 assumptions used in the sensitivity analyses. 1 P-values test the
null hypothesis that transmission does not vary between study
phase (likelihood ratio test, df=3). 2 P-values test the null
hypothesis that transmission in the current phase does not differ
between wards (likelihood ratio test, df=1).
(PDF)
Table S4 Estimates of the daily transmission probabil-
ity (q) from one exposed to one susceptible patient under
SA1 and SA2 assumptions. Estimates of the daily transmission
probability (q) from one exposed to one susceptible patient under
assumptions SA1 and SA2. See protocol S1 in supporting material
for details of the SA1 and SA2 assumptions used in thesse
sensitivity analyses. 1. P-values test the null hypothesis that
transmission varies between study phases but not MRSA types
against the alternative that it varies between study phases and
MRSA types (likelihood ratio test, df=4). 2 P-values test the null
hypothesis that transmission in the study phase does not differ
between TW and Non-TW MRSA using combined data from
both wards (likelihood ratio test, df=1).
(PDF)
Table S5 Estimates of the daily transmission probabil-
ity (q) from one exposed to one susceptible patient and
from background transmission sources. ‘Patient to patient’
estimates corresponds to the daily transmission probability (q) from
one exposed to one susceptible patient. Background estimates
corresponds to the daily probability of acquisition from back-
ground sources (such as environmental contamination). This
probability is assumed to remain constant within each phase for
each of the two MRSA types. In some cases confidence intervals
could not be estimated for numerical reasons, while in others the
very wide confidence intervals indicate that parameters are weakly
identifiable. For both ICUs we compared the model with
background and patient-to-patient transmission (with both phase
and MRSA-type specific parameters) with nested models with only
background transmission (but still with both phase and MRSA-
type specific parameters) using a likelihood ratio test based on the
chi-squared distribution with eight degrees of freedom. The results
gave strong evidence to prefer the more complex model in the case
of ICU2 (p=0.008), but no evidence to prefer it in the case of ICU
1 (p=0.70).
(PDF)
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